Section 514 · Paragraph 496. Suspension of a police officer during a departmental or judicial inquiry into a charge of misconduct

All police officers are liable to suspension during a departmental or judicial inquiry into a charge of misconduct. The suspension of an officer may be ordered by the authority empowered to impose any form of departmental punishment. For example, the Superintendent of Police may suspend a person, even if he or she cannot dismiss him or her.
The Superintendent must suspend any police officer whose prosecution has been ordered by him or a Deputy Inspector General, or whose prosecution has resulted from an inquiry by a magistrate, pending the conclusion of the trial. If a charge has been instituted on a complaint by a private individual, the Superintendent of Police must decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused.
The suspending authority shall pass a conditional order fixing the rate of suspension allowance under Fundamental Rule 53(c) at the time of suspension and, in the case of an officer who owns a horse, the payment of horse allowance up to a period of three months. If the proceedings are unlikely to be concluded within this three-month period, the officer will have the right to dispose of his horse.
Brief Note
The purpose of suspension is to ensure impartial conduct of investigation proceedings. A delinquent employee against whom an investigation into serious charges is proposed by the competent authority may be suspended until the completion of the investigation to prevent him from abusing his position.
(1) When is suspension necessary? - Suspension temporarily suspends the relationship between master and servant. During the period of suspension, the contract of service remains in force, and the employee remains in service and entitled to all the benefits associated with it, but he is not required to work. AIR 1971 Ill. 214 states that even while suspended, his salary increments will continue to be paid unless stopped. When an employee is detained in custody, suspension occurs automatically. After discharge, whether a suspension order has been passed or not, the suspension must be revoked, as provided in 1980 (1) SLR 678. G.O. No. 22-4-1971 (Appointment B), dated 2-7-71, intended that suspension should be imposed only when the charge is serious and may result in dismissal, and in such a situation, a charge sheet should be filed without delay. G.O. No. 7-8-1977 Personnel-1, dated 30-7-77, citing earlier Government Orders, directed that departmental proceedings be concluded within the given time schedule. G.O. No. 7-9-1980 Personnel-1, dated 7-6-80, referring to earlier Government Orders, reminds that the provision for granting a second chance has been abolished by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. Civil M. Writ No. 4961/74 held that a suspension order should not be issued until a chargesheet is filed. This is also supported in Ram Ganesh Rai vs. State, decided on 10-2-1976, Allahabad, and J.C. Chauhan vs. State, 1.
(2) Place of Residence During Suspension - State vs. Chhotelal held that in a case where an officer has been granted bail by a court, the Superintendent of Police's order that the officer remain in the police lines during the suspension period will not be effective.
(3) Public Interest - "Public interest" can have different meanings when used in different laws. When witnesses are hesitant to testify because they are subordinate to the criminal officer, or when it is necessary to protect witnesses from pressure or interference with records, or when there is a public movement demanding the immediate transfer of a police officer, all grounds for transfer would be in the public interest. Where the allegations are serious, such as moral turpitude, bribery, corruption, or embezzlement, the officer's continued employment may be considered in the public interest, and his or her suspension may be considered. The power to suspend may be exercised within legal limits. In Sudhir Kumar v. Superintendent of Police, suspension for absence without leave was held to be legal and in the public interest.
(4) When is suspension not justified? In Aryaveer Saxena v. State, suspension was held to be without legal basis where no investigation was underway or conducted at the time of suspension, and this situation persisted for three years without a charge sheet. It was also held that this was sufficient to prove that no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated at the time of suspension.
Claim No. 380 F/3/1977, dated 21-11-1979, filed by Sub-Inspector Sagir Ahmed in the Tribunal, was accepted with costs on the basis that no judicial or departmental inquiry was pending against him at the time of suspension, as required by this provision. In Ram Ganesh vs. State (Writ No. 4961/74), the suspension order dated 10-2-1976 was also quashed on the grounds that no judicial or departmental proceedings were pending against him at the time of the order.
Where the competent authority did not exercise due diligence in passing the suspension order in accordance with the government's directives or instructions, the suspension order was deemed erroneous and quashed.
The Police Regulations do not consider suspension at the stage of an inquiry. The Superintendent of Police is empowered to suspend only after departmental proceedings have been initiated against an employee, not before. A suspension order passed before the initiation of departmental proceedings is illegal.
The petitioner, a police constable, was suspended on 31-8-1982, but even after more than two and a half years, neither was a charge sheet served on him nor was disciplinary action initiated. In light of these facts, the suspension was revoked due to excessive and unreasonable delay.
(5) When does suspension expire? When a suspended employee is subsequently removed from service through departmental proceedings, the suspension order is incorporated into the suspension. When the removal order is quashed by a court, the employee is considered to be in service, and the suspension order is also considered to have ended. In W.B. Karaiya v. Deputy Managing Director, it was held that the suspension was replaced by dismissal, which subsequently ended.
(6) When should suspension be considered - A suspension order is neither dismissal nor discharge, and therefore, Article 311(2) of the Constitution is not applicable.
When an employee has been dismissed as a result of a court conviction and is acquitted on appeal, the department may, after reinstating the employee in service, initiate further investigation proceedings on a different charge. However, in this situation, the government employee will still be considered under suspension.
The court, while quashing the department's dismissal order, left it to the discretion of the departmental officer to consider further action against the employee. However, it was not clear whether the officer had taken the decision to take further action, and therefore, the employee would not be considered suspended.
(7) Amount due for the period of suspension - A government employee, after being suspended on 1-2-68 and acquitted by the High Court on 9-4-74 and reinstated, demanded payment of his remaining salary and other dues for his previous term. This demand was made within three years of his joining. The Limitation Act prohibits periods prior to the last three years, but this was not considered applicable because the employee became entitled to the balance of the amount only after his reinstatement, and he was considered entitled to receive the entire amount for the previous term.